Series: Penn State Logic Seminar

Date: Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Time: 2:30 - 3:20 PM

Place: 316 Willard Building

Speaker: Emily Grosholz, Philosophy Department, Penn State

Title: Kant's Account of Geometrical Objects

Abstract: 

Kant defines intuition and conception as distinct kinds of
representations: intuition is immediate and conception is mediate.
The problem is that all intelligible unity is referred to concepts.
This means that, for different reasons, both the unity of space and
the unity of particular figures is problematic for Kant -- as well as
for commentators after Kant.  I will take up this issues in the spirit
of Leibniz, and try to find a resolution for a few of these problems.
This problem is timely, because the status of geometry vis a vis
arithmetic and analysis needs to be reconsidered in contemporary
philosophy of mathematics.